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FEDERALIST No. 80
The Powers of the Judiciary
From McLEAN's Edition, New York.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:
To JUDGE with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal
 judicature, it will be necessary to consider, in the first place,
 what are its proper objects.
It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the judicary
 authority of the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions
 of cases: 1st, to all those which arise out of the laws of the
 United States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional
 powers of legislation; 2d, to all those which concern the execution
 of the provisions expressly contained in the articles of Union; 3d,
 to all those in which the United States are a party; 4th, to all
 those which involve the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they
 relate to the intercourse between the United States and foreign
 nations, or to that between the States themselves; 5th, to all
 those which originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty or
 maritime jurisdiction; and, lastly, to all those in which the State
 tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased.
The first point depends upon this obvious consideration, that
 there ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy
 to constitutional provisions. What, for instance, would avail
 restrictions on the authority of the State legislatures, without
 some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of them? The
 States, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited from doing a
 variety of things, some of which are incompatible with the interests
 of the Union, and others with the principles of good government.
 The imposition of duties on imported articles, and the emission of
 paper money, are specimens of each kind. No man of sense will
 believe, that such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded,
 without some effectual power in the government to restrain or
 correct the infractions of them. This power must either be a direct
 negative on the State laws, or an authority in the federal courts to
 overrule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles
 of Union. There is no third course that I can imagine. The latter
 appears to have been thought by the convention preferable to the
 former, and, I presume, will be most agreeable to the States.
As to the second point, it is impossible, by any argument or
 comment, to make it clearer than it is in itself. If there are such
 things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a
 government being coextensive with its legislative, may be ranked
 among the number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the
 interpretation of the national laws, decides the question. Thirteen
 independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes,
 arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which
 nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.
Still less need be said in regard to the third point.
 Controversies between the nation and its members or citizens, can
 only be properly referred to the national tribunals. Any other plan
 would be contrary to reason, to precedent, and to decorum.
The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that the peace
 of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The
 Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the
 conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought
 ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As the
 denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as well
 as in any other manner, is with reason classed among the just causes
 of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have
 cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries
 are concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of
 the public faith, than to the security of the public tranquillity.
 A distinction may perhaps be imagined between cases arising upon
 treaties and the laws of nations and those which may stand merely on
 the footing of the municipal law. The former kind may be supposed
 proper for the federal jurisdiction, the latter for that of the
 States. But it is at least problematical, whether an unjust
 sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of controversy was
 wholly relative to the lex loci, would not, if unredressed, be
 an aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one which violated the
 stipulations of a treaty or the general law of nations. And a still
 greater objection to the distinction would result from the immense
 difficulty, if not impossibility, of a practical discrimination
 between the cases of one complexion and those of the other. So
 great a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties,
 involve national questions, that it is by far most safe and most
 expedient to refer all those in which they are concerned to the
 national tribunals.
The power of determining causes between two States, between one
 State and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of
 different States, is perhaps not less essential to the peace of the
 Union than that which has been just examined. History gives us a
 horrid picture of the dissensions and private wars which distracted
 and desolated Germany prior to the institution of the Imperial
 Chamber by Maximilian, towards the close of the fifteenth century;
 and informs us, at the same time, of the vast influence of that
 institution in appeasing the disorders and establishing the
 tranquillity of the empire. This was a court invested with
 authority to decide finally all differences among the members of the
 Germanic body.
A method of terminating territorial disputes between the States,
 under the authority of the federal head, was not unattended to, even
 in the imperfect system by which they have been hitherto held
 together. But there are many other sources, besides interfering
 claims of boundary, from which bickerings and animosities may spring
 up among the members of the Union. To some of these we have been
 witnesses in the course of our past experience. It will readily be
 conjectured that I allude to the fraudulent laws which have been
 passed in too many of the States. And though the proposed
 Constitution establishes particular guards against the repetition of
 those instances which have heretofore made their appearance, yet it
 is warrantable to apprehend that the spirit which produced them will
 assume new shapes, that could not be foreseen nor specifically
 provided against. Whatever practices may have a tendency to disturb
 the harmony between the States, are proper objects of federal
 superintendence and control.
It may be esteemed the basis of the Union, that ``the citizens
 of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities
 of citizens of the several States.'' And if it be a just principle
 that every government OUGHT TO POSSESS THE MEANS OF EXECUTING ITS
 OWN PROVISIONS BY ITS OWN AUTHORITY, it will follow, that in order
 to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and
 immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the
 national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State
 or its citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens. To
 secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all
 evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should
 be committed to that tribunal which, having no local attachments,
 will be likely to be impartial between the different States and
 their citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the
 Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the
 principles on which it is founded.
The fifth point will demand little animadversion. The most
 bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a
 disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizances of
 maritime causes. These so generally depend on the laws of nations,
 and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall
 within the considerations which are relative to the public peace.
 The most important part of them are, by the present Confederation,
 submitted to federal jurisdiction.
The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases
 in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial,
 speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own
 cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least interest
 or bias. This principle has no inconsiderable weight in designating
 the federal courts as the proper tribunals for the determination of
 controversies between different States and their citizens. And it
 ought to have the same operation in regard to some cases between
 citizens of the same State. Claims to land under grants of
 different States, founded upon adverse pretensions of boundary, are
 of this description. The courts of neither of the granting States
 could be expected to be unbiased. The laws may have even prejudged
 the question, and tied the courts down to decisions in favor of the
 grants of the State to which they belonged. And even where this had
 not been done, it would be natural that the judges, as men, should
 feel a strong predilection to the claims of their own government.
Having thus laid down and discussed the principles which ought
 to regulate the constitution of the federal judiciary, we will
 proceed to test, by these principles, the particular powers of
 which, according to the plan of the convention, it is to be composed.
 It is to comprehend ``all cases in law and equity arising under
 the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made,
 or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases
 affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all
 cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to
 which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between
 two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State;
 between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same
 State claiming lands and grants of different States; and between a
 State or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, and
 subjects.'' This constitutes the entire mass of the judicial
 authority of the Union. Let us now review it in detail. It is,
 then, to extend:
First. To all cases in law and equity, ARISING UNDER THE
 CONSTITUTION and THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES. This corresponds
 with the two first classes of causes, which have been enumerated, as
 proper for the jurisdiction of the United States. It has been
 asked, what is meant by ``cases arising under the Constitution,'' in
 contradiction from those ``arising under the laws of the United
 States''? The difference has been already explained. All the
 restrictions upon the authority of the State legislatures furnish
 examples of it. They are not, for instance, to emit paper money;
 but the interdiction results from the Constitution, and will have
 no connection with any law of the United States. Should paper
 money, notwithstanding, be emited, the controversies concerning it
 would be cases arising under the Constitution and not the laws of
 the United States, in the ordinary signification of the terms. This
 may serve as a sample of the whole.
It has also been asked, what need of the word ``equity What
 equitable causes can grow out of the Constitution and laws of the
 United States? There is hardly a subject of litigation between
 individuals, which may not involve those ingredients of FRAUD,
 ACCIDENT, TRUST, or HARDSHIP, which would render the matter an
 object of equitable rather than of legal jurisdiction, as the
 distinction is known and established in several of the States. It
 is the peculiar province, for instance, of a court of equity to
 relieve against what are called hard bargains: these are contracts
 in which, though there may have been no direct fraud or deceit,
 sufficient to invalidate them in a court of law, yet there may have
 been some undue and unconscionable advantage taken of the
 necessities or misfortunes of one of the parties, which a court of
 equity would not tolerate. In such cases, where foreigners were
 concerned on either side, it would be impossible for the federal
 judicatories to do justice without an equitable as well as a legal
 jurisdiction. Agreements to convey lands claimed under the grants
 of different States, may afford another example of the necessity of
 an equitable jurisdiction in the federal courts. This reasoning may
 not be so palpable in those States where the formal and technical
 distinction between LAW and EQUITY is not maintained, as in this
 State, where it is exemplified by every day's practice.
The judiciary authority of the Union is to extend:
Second. To treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
 authority of the United States, and to all cases affecting
 ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. These belong to
 the fourth class of the enumerated cases, as they have an evident
 connection with the preservation of the national peace.
Third. To cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
 These form, altogether, the fifth of the enumerated classes of
 causes proper for the cognizance of the national courts.
Fourth. To controversies to which the United States shall be
 a party. These constitute the third of those classes.
Fifth. To controversies between two or more States; between
 a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of
 different States. These belong to the fourth of those classes, and
 partake, in some measure, of the nature of the last.
Sixth. To cases between the citizens of the same State,
 CLAIMING LANDS UNDER GRANTS OF DIFFERENT STATES. These fall within
 the last class, and ARE THE ONLY INSTANCES IN WHICH THE PROPOSED
 CONSTITUTION DIRECTLY CONTEMPLATES THE COGNIZANCE OF DISPUTES
 BETWEEN THE CITIZENS OF THE SAME STATE.
Seventh. To cases between a State and the citizens thereof,
 and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. These have been already
 explained to belong to the fourth of the enumerated classes, and
 have been shown to be, in a peculiar manner, the proper subjects of
 the national judicature.
From this review of the particular powers of the federal
 judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution, it appears that they
 are all conformable to the principles which ought to have governed
 the structure of that department, and which were necessary to the
 perfection of the system. If some partial inconviences should
 appear to be connected with the incorporation of any of them into
 the plan, it ought to be recollected that the national legislature
 will have ample authority to make such EXCEPTIONS, and to prescribe
 such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or remove these
 inconveniences. The possibility of particular mischiefs can never
 be viewed, by a wellinformed mind, as a solid objection to a general
 principle, which is calculated to avoid general mischiefs and to
 obtain general advantages.
PUBLIUS.